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GLOBE INTERNATIONAL, INC. )
)
Defendant and Petitioner. )
__________________________________________ )
PETITIONER'S BRIEF ON THE MERITS
On Appeal from the Judgment of the Superior Court 
of the State of California, County of Los Angeles 
the Honorable Richard G. Harris, Judge
Review of the Decision of the Court of Appeal,
Second District, Division Seven
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Preliminary Statement
On March 14, 1990, Khalid Iqbal Khawar, ("Respondent"), sued 
Roundtable Publishing, Inc., Robert Morrow and Globe 
International, Inc., ("Globe") for defamation. (Reporter's 
Transcript ("R.T.") 137.) Respondent and Roundtable Publishing, 
Inc., settled their dispute prior to trial. See Khawar v. Globe 
Int'l, Inc., 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 92, 98, rev, granted 57 Cal. Rptr. 
2d 277 (1996). The superior court entered default judgment
1
against Robert Morrow. See id. After a jury trial, the court 
entered judgment on special verdict against Globe on April 15, 
1994. (R.T. 3110.) The court held that Respondent was a private
figure. (R.T. 2735). Moreover, contrary to the jury's advisory 
finding, the judge held that the Globe article was not an 
accurate and neutral report. (R.T. 2740.) Furthermore, the 
court ruled that Globe published the article with actual malice. 
(R.T. 2760, 2763.) The jury awarded Respondent $100,000 for harm 
to reputation, $400,000 for emotional distress, $175,000 for 
presumed damages and $500,000 in punitive damages. (R.T. 2783, 
2791.)
Globe filed a timely notice of appeal on June 6, 1994. See 
Khawar, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 99. The court of appeal affirmed the 
trial court's judgment on June 5, 1996, See id. at 111. This 
Court subsequently granted review on September 25, 1996.
Statement of Facts
Respondent was a member of the press covering the 1968 
presidential primary victory speech of Senator Robert F. Kennedy. 
(R.T. 1338.) He purposely arrived early in the evening to have 
his picture ta]cen with Senator Kennedy, (R.T. 1340.) Respondent 
then placed himself on the podium next to the Senator during his 
presentation. (R.T. 1339.) After Senator Kennedy had been shot. 
Respondent began taking pictures of bystanders who had also been 
shot or were otherwise caught in the rampage. (R.T. 1341.) 
Subsequently, Respondent was questioned by the Los Angeles Police
2
Department and the Federal Bureau of Investigations, to whom he 
identified himself only as Khalid Iqbal. (R.T, 1342, 1351-52.)
Following the assassination. Respondent gained public 
notoriety in connection with the controversy. (R.T. 1604-06.)
He was pictured next to Senator Kennedy on the cover of the June 
14, 1968, edition of Time, which he purchased as a reminder of 
his connection to the event. (R.T. 1392.) Moreover, Robert 
Kaiser referred to Respondent in the 1970 book RFK Must Die, 
questioning why Respondent had not been interviewed in connection 
with the assassination. (R.T. 1408.) Finally, Respondent was 
not surprised to see himself on television frequently in 
connection with Senator Kennedy's assassination, but actually 
recorded those programs. (R.T. 1393.)
In 1989, the Globe reported on the publication of ex-CIA 
agent Robert Morrow's book. The Senator Must Die. (R.T. 848, 
3146.) The book alleged that Respondent was a participant in the 
assassination of Senator Robert F. Kennedy. (R.T. 3146.) The 
Globe's report consisted of the article and a photograph, from 
Mr. Morrow's book, showing Respondent standing on the podium, 
near Senator Kennedy, prior to the assassination. (R.T, 3146.)
As to the content of the article, Mr. Jonathan L. Kirsch, 
contributor to the Los Angeles Times and expert witness for the 
Globe, testified that the article was an accurate and fair report 
of the contents of the book. (R.T. 1583, 1594.) In addition,
Mr. Kirsch testified that the Globe did not endorse the
3
propositions in Mr. Morrow's book/ as evidenced by the fact that 
the article only repeated what Mr. Morrow alleged in his book. 
{R.T. 1595.) Furthermore, Mr. Kirsch testified that the use of 
disclaimers such as "Mr. Morrow claims," is a standard 
journalistic tool to distance the author from the allegations 
that he or she reports. (R.T. 1596.)
Mr. Blackburn did, however, attempt to contact Ali Ahmand 
through the Los Angeles telephone directory, while unaware that 
his real name was Khalid Iqbal Khawar. (R.T. 1121.)
Mr. Blackburn also stated that he probably contacted his 
acquaintance Colonel Prouty, a conspiracy expert and the author 
of the forward for The Senator Must Die. (R.T. 1084.) He 
likewise probably contacted Mr, Mankiewicz, a Robert Kennedy 
campaign advisor, to verify the claims in the Morrow book, (R.T. 
1123.) Finally, Mr, Blackburn was also well acquainted with Mr. 
Thomas Naguchi, who performed the autopsy on Robert Kennedy and 




1. Whether an individual becomes an involuntary limited-purpose 
public figure by placing himself in the middle of a 
publicized public controversy such as the presidential 
primary election that ended in the candidate's 
assassination.
2. Whether the disinterested republication of newsworthy 
allegations seeking to inform the public about a public 
controversy, the assassination of a United States 
Presidential candidate, is privileged under the neutral 
reportage doctrine,
3. Whether a magazine acts without actual malice when, lacking 
serious doubts as to the truthfulness of the statements 
contained therein, it publishes an article.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Respondent is an involuntary limited-purpose public figure 
with regard to the public controversy surrounding the 
assassination of Senator Robert Kennedy. First, the 
assassination of Senator Kennedy is an identifiable public 
controversy of the rarest occurrence that effects more than the 
active participants involved. Second, Respondent played more 
than a tangential or trivial role in the controversy surrounding 
the death of Senator Kennedy when he placed himself in the vortex 
of the public controversy. Finally, the defamatory statements 
directly relate to Respondent's role in the assassination 
controversy.
An accurate and neutral republication of newsworthy charges 
about a public figure are privileged under the doctrine of 
neutral reportage. Neutral reportage should be adopted in 
California because it is rooted in the New York Times 
constitutional protection for free press and the common law 
privilege of fair report. However, neutral reportage is a new 
and coexistent constitutional protection, because it shields 
republishers, regardless of their subjective doubt in the 
substantive allegations. Thus, the privilege preserves the First 
Amendment rights of neutral and accurate republishers who seek to 
inform the public about newsworthy events surrounding public 
figures. This privilege has been acknowledged in California case 
law. Furthermore, the privilege can be invoked against private
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plaintiffs because the focus of the privilege, neutral and 
accurate republication, is mutually exclusive from the status of 
the plaintiff.
Here, the neutral reportage privilege protects Globe, the 
republisher, from liability. Globe merely reported newsworthy 
allegations made by Mr. Robert Morrow, a prominent and 
responsible source, in his book The Senator Must Die. Globe did 
not concur or exaggerate in Mr. Morrow's allegations. Globe 
merely informed the public about the publication of the book as a 
news event, allowing the public to determine the truth of the 
allegations.
Finally, Globe lacked the necessary constitutional malice 
required for Respondent to recover in this action. Respondent 
has failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that Globe 
acted knowingly or with reckless disregard of the falsity of the 
statements. Even if this Court finds Respondent to be a private 
figure, he still must prove constitutional malice in order to 
recover presumed or punitive damages, because the statements 
concern a public controversy,
ARGUMENT
I. RESPONDENT IS AN INVOLUNTARY LIMITED-PURPOSE PUBLIC
FIGURE WITH REGARD TO THE PUBLIC CONTROVERSY SURROUNDING 
THE ASSASSINATION OF SENATOR ROBERT F. KENNEDY.
Respondent became an involuntary public figure for the 
limited purpose of discussing the assassination of Senator Robert 
Kennedy when he placed himself at the very center of the
7
California presidential primary that resulted in the Senator's 
demise. The United States Supreme Court recognized the 
involuntary public figure status over two decades ago when it 
held that "hypothetically" it is possible for a person to become 
a public figure "through no purposeful action of their own/" but 
that such a situation would be extremely rare. Gertz v. Robert 
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974), A plaintiff becomes an 
involuntary limited-purpose public figure when (1) there exits an 
identifiable public controversy, (2) the plaintiff plays more 
than a trivial or tangential role in the controversy, and (3) the 
alleged defamatory statements are germane to the plaintiff's role 
in that controversy. See Bay View Packing Co. v, Taff, 543 
N.W.2d 522, 531 (1995); cf. Dameron v. Washington Magazine, Inc., 
779 F.2d 736, 741 (D.C. Cir. 1985). Once a plaintiff has 
attained such status he or she must prove constitutional "actual 
malice" in order to recover in a defamation suit. See Gertz, 418 
U.S. at 332. Plaintiff's public figure status is reviewed ^ 
novo, for it is a fact germane to the question of constitutional 
malice. See McCoy v. Hearst Corp., 42 Cal. 3d 835, 842 (1986).
A. The Assassination of Senator Robert F. Kennedy Is an
Identifiable Public Controversy of the Rarest Occurrence
That Effects More Than the Active Participants Involved.
Respondent was involved in an "exceedingly rare" public 
controversy: the assassination of Senator Robert Kennedy. A 
public controversy exists when the "issue was being debated 
publicly and . . . had foreseeable and substantial ramifications
8
for nonparticipants." Copp v, Paxton, 45 Cal. App. 4th 829, 844 
(1996) (citing Waldbaum v, Fairchild Publications, Inc., 627 F.2d 
1287, 1297 (D.C. Cir. 1980)). For the court to determine whether 
a public controversy exists it should look to see if "the press 
was covering the debate, reporting what people were saying and 
uncovering facts and theories to help the public formulate some 
judgment." Waldbaum, 627 F,2d at 1297. In sum, the court should 
ask if reasonable people who were not active participants in the 
controversy would be affected by the outcome. See id.
The Kennedy assassination is an identifiable public 
controversy. The assassination of Senator Robert Kennedy is 
practically a per se public controversy, because it has been the 
subject of heavy official and public scrutiny, including 
conspiracy theories and historical treatises. Indeed, nearly 
three decades later, the public interest in the tragedy has not 
abated. Even today books and articles are published reexamining 
the happenings of that fateful event, which sometimes ignore 
official conclusions and ask what "really" happened. For 
example, Jonathan Bankin's Conspiracies, Coverups and Crimes, 
published in 1991, even examines Respondent's possible role in 
the assassination of Senator Kennedy. (R.T, 1409.) The 
assassination of a United States Senator, a presidential 
candidate and a member of the Kennedy family is a public 
controversy of the broadest scope and the rarest occurrence.
Thus, the assassination of Robert Kennedy is a public
9
controversy, the effects of which are felt beyond those directly 
involved even to this day. This assassination controversy is 
precisely the exceedingly rare circumstance the Gertz Court 
contemplated. See 418 U.S. at 345.
B. Respondent Played More Than a Tangential or Trivial
Role in the Controversy Surrounding the Death of
Senator Robert Kennedy When He Placed Himself in the
Vortex of the Assassination.
After isolating the public controversy, the court then 
examines the plaintiff's role in that controversy to determine 
whether it was more than trivial or tangential. See Bay View 
Packing, 543 N.W.2d at 531; cf_^ Waldbaum, 627 F.2d at 1297.
Though he did not desire to be drawn into the public controversy, 
Respondent nonetheless played more than a tangential or trivial 
role in the Robert Kennedy controversy when he was drawn into it 
by "sheer bad luck" and by his own course of actions that invited 
attention and comment. The focus of the inquiry is on the 
plaintiff's "role in the public controversy 'rather than on any 
desire for publicity or other voluntary act' on their part." Bay 
View Packing, 543 N.W.2d at 533 (citation omitted) (this focus 
distinguishes the involuntary public figure analysis from that of 
the voluntary public figure, because it does not require 
voluntary "thrusting" into the public controversy). Thus, a 
defamation plaintiff can become a public figure through no 
deliberate action of his or her own. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345.
What is required is that the plaintiff's activities
"inevitably" draw them into the "vortex" of the public 
controversy, Bay View Packing, 543 N.W.2d at 533 (citing Weigel 
V. Capital Times Co., 426 N.W.2d 43, 50 (1988)), even if by 
"sheer bad luck." Dameron, 779 F.2d at 742. It is enough that 
the plaintiff engaged in acts that were "bound to invite 
attention and comment." Bay View Packing, 543 N,W.2d at 533. In 
Bay View Packing, the state notified the meat processing company 
("Bay View") that the local water supply had been contaminated 
and any water used in processing meat should first be boiled.
543 N.W.2d at 525. The state also recommended that Bay View 
recall its distributed products. See id. However, not until the 
United States Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") ordered Bay 
View to recall its products from distribution did the company 
comply. See id. The Wisconsin Supreme Court concluded that 
through the "sheer bad luck" of the contamination, Bay View's 
failure to comply with the advisory opinion of the state and the 
FDA's recall recommendation, the company had voluntarily engaged 
in a course of activity that resulted in their being inevitably 
drawn into the vortex of the public controversy. See id. at 533. 
What is more. Bay View's inaction in light of the public concern 
made its role more than tangential or trivial. See id.
Here, by "sheer bad luck" of the assassination. Respondent's 
own course of activities before and after the killing drew him 
into the vortex of the public controversy surrounding the death
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of Senator Robert Kennedy. Before Senator Kennedy took the stage 
for his victory speech, Respondent pulled him aside to have his 
picture taken with him. (R.T. 1341.) Respondent then took a 
position very close to Senator Kennedy on the podium, presumably 
to get the best shots of the event. (R.T, 1339.) As soon as 
Senator Kennedy left the podium and was shot. Respondent began 
taking photographs of bystanders who had also been shot or were 
otherwise caught in the frenzy. (R.T. 1341.) Respondent was 
subsequently question by the Los Angeles Police Department 
("LAPD") and the Federal Bureau of Investigations ("FBI") on 
several occasions and appeared on the cover of the June 14, 1968, 
edition of Time standing next to Senator Kennedy. (R.T. 1342, 
1392.)
Accordingly, like in Bay View Packing, though Respondent did 
not desire to become part of the public controversy surrounding 
the assassination of Senator Robert Kennedy, his voluntary 
activities "inevitably" drew him into the "vortex" of the public 
controversy. Furthermore, Respondent testified to the fact that 
he was not surprised to see himself on television an incalculable 
number of times in connection with the assassination of Senator 
Kennedy, and, in fact. Respondent has video recorded many of the 
television programs for his personal use. (R.T. 1393.) Thus, it 
is evident, even to the Respondent himself, that his acts on the 
night of the killing drew him into the controversy. Therefore, 
following Bay View Packing, Respondent's role in this exceedingly
12
rare public controversy surrounding the death of Senator Kennedy 
was more than tangential or trivial.
Where a plaintiff is drawn into a public controversy, even 
by "sheer bad luck," and subject to official and non-official 
investigation, he or she becomes an involuntary limited-purpose 
public figure. See Dameron, 779 F.2d at 742, In Darneron, the 
Plaintiff, who "by sheer bad luck" happened to be on duty the 
night of the Mt. Weather airplane crash, was dragged, by no fault 
of his own, into the subsequent public controversy surrounding 
air-traffic safety. See Dameron, 779 F.2d at 742. The court 
held that the plaintiff was an involuntary public figure, because 
he did not purposefully seek public attention but was drawn into 
the controversy by no purposeful action of his own. See id. at 
741. The court stated that the plaintiff was an "ordinary 
citizen . . . completely unknown to the public before the [crash]
. . . and never acquired notoriety apart from the crash." Id. 
However, the court relied on the heavy official and non-official 
investigations of the event to conclude that the plaintiff had 
been drawn into the public controversy involuntarily and had 
played a significant role in it, even though he was completely 
cleared of any wrongdoing. Id. at 742,
Here, Respondent was likewise also unknown prior to the 
controversy, drawn into it "by sheer bad luck" and then the 
subject of official and non-official investigations into the 
assassination of Senator Kennedy. As noted above, the Respondent
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was investigated by the LAPD and FBI and pictured on the cover of 
Time in connection to the Kennedy controversy. (R.T. 1342,
1392.) Mr. Morrow's book, on which the Globe article is based, 
is just one of the more recent investigations into the 
controversy surrounding the Robert Kennedy assassination and 
espouses a new idea, involving the Respondent, about who was 
actually responsible for the killing. (R.T. 3146.) Another such 
book, as noted above, which discusses Respondent's role in the 
controversy was just recently published in 1991 by Jonathan 
Bankin: Conspiracies, Coverups and Crimes. (R.T. 1409.) 
Accordingly, like in Dameron, Respondent, here, played more than 
a tangential or trivial role in the controversy surrounding the 
death of Senator Kennedy. In sum. Respondent has satisfied the 
second part of the involuntary public figure test.
C. The Defamatory Statements Directly Relate to
Respondent's Connection to the Assassination
Controversy.
Limited-purpose public figures lose protection of their 
reputation only to the extent that the alleged defamatory 
statements directly relate to their roles in public 
controversies. Reader's Digest Assoc, v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 
3d 244, 253-54 (1984). Here, the statements in the Globe 
article, which merely report on the allegations made by Morrow, 
"directly relate" to the Respondent's role in the public 
controversy surrounding the assassination of Senator Kennedy.
The statements claim that Respondent, in his capacity as a
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photographer, used his position to aid in the assassination of 
Senator Kennedy. (R.T. 3146.) Thus, plaintiff is an involuntary 
public figure for the limited purpose of discussing the 
controversy around the assassination of Senator Kennedy, because 
all three elements of the test in Bay View Packing are satisfied. 
Accordingly, we pray that this Court find in favor of Globe and 
reverse the decision of the lower court.
II. THE NEUTRAL REPORTAGE DOCTRINE SHOULD BE ADOPTED IN
CALIFORNIA BECAUSE IT IS AN EXTENSION OF THE NEW YORK TIMES 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION AND COMMON LAW PRIVILEGE OF FAIR 
REPORT FOR REPUBLISHERS.
This Court should adopt the neutral reportage privilege 
because it is an extension of the constitutional protection for 
free press and the common law privilege of fair report. Absent 
the privilege, republishers lose the opportunity to publish, 
without reproach, allegations that are of public interest, 
because they may be unverifiable or only partially true. Hence, 
newsworthy information would not reach the public.
Neutral reportage protects the publication of newsworthy 
issues that are not discussed or alleged during a public 
proceeding. See generally Edwards v. National Audubon Society, 
556 F.2d 113 {2d Cir. 1977). The privilege protects 
repiiblication of valuable and newsworthy allegations, not because 
the publisher attaches value to the defamation, but because the 
allegations concern a public controversy, of public interest,
regarding a public figure.
The determination of whether the neutral reportage privilege 
applies is reviewable de novo^ because it implicates First 
Amendment constitutional protections for republishers. ^ Time, 
Inc. V. Pape, 401 U.S. 279, 284 (1971) (holding that where there 
is a claim of the denial of constitutional rights reviewing 
courts are not bound by the conclusions of lower courts but can 
review the evidentiary basis of the trial court's conclusions).
A. The Doctrine of Neutral Reportage Furthers 
the Constitutional Protection of Freedom of
Press.
The First Amendment states that "Congress shall make no law 
. . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press." U.S. 
Const, amend. I. The California Constitution elaborates:
"[e]very person may freely speak, write and publish his or her 
sentiments on all subjects ... A law may not restrain or 
abridge liberty of speech or press," as long as the publisher 
takes responsibility for her actions. Cal. Const, art. I, § 2. 
Even though there is no complete constitutional protection for 
defamatory speech, "a bonus zone of protection is extended to it 
nonetheless in order to protect speech that is covered." Ray 
Worthy Cambell, The Developing Privilege of Neutral Reportage, 69 
Va. L. Rev. 853, 860 (1983).
'Public figures include limited-purpose involuntary public 
figures. See Dameron, 779 F.2d at 741.
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Neutral reportage extends the "bonus zone" of protection to 
republishers, while ensuring relief for the defamed plaintiff. 
Under the privilege the original defamer is responsible for her 
own words, despite their public interest value. However, the 
republisher is not liable for neutrally reporting the statements 
of the original declarant. Without this privilege every 
republisher, for fear of liability, will not report the original 
newsworthy statement. This failure to report only frustrates the 
possibility of further inquiry and resolution of those issues.
See David Marburger, More Protection for the Press: The Third 
Circuit Expands the Fair Report Privilege, 43 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 
1143, 1160 (1982), Furthermore, the republisher's subjective 
doubts are irrelevant, because they do not alter the nature of 
the newsworthy issues. See Rodney A. Nelson, Neutral Reportage: 
^king Sense of Edwards v. Edwards Audubon Society, Inc., 20 Cap. 
U. L. Rev. 471, 492 (1991). A newsworthy public controversy does 
not become any less significant to the public if the reporter 
doubts the truth of statements, for it is the public who will 
finally decide whether the statements are credible. S^ i^ 
Hence, neutral reportage promotes "open debate" and the public's 
access to information.
1• Neutral reportage is coexistent with 
the Court's interpretation of defamation
raw in Gertz v. Welch.
The neutral reportage privilege is coexistent with Gertz v. 
WeL^. In Gertz, the Court focused on the status of the defamed
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plaintiff as opposed to the newsworthiness of the public 
controversy. See generally 418 U.S. 323. However, since Gertz, 
the Court has utilized a "public interest" analysis to determine 
whether a constitutional protection is compelled in defamation 
cases. See Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc, v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 
776 (1986) (holding that plaintiff, a private figure, had to 
prove actual malice and falsity of the statements on matters of 
public concern in order to recover damages); Dun & Bradstreet 
Inc. V. Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. 749, 763 (1984) (allowing 
plaintiff, a private figure, to recover presumed and punitive 
damages absent a showing of actual malice only because there was 
no p\iblic controversy). In Hepps, the Court merely extended the 
holding in Dun & Bradstreet, which distinguished between private 
figures connected with public controversies and private figures 
involved in private controversies. 475 U.S. at 775-76. Hence, 
by distinguishing between private figures who are involved in 
private matters and those involved in public controversies, the 
Court has not abandoned a public concern analysis. See Dun & 
Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 763. Therefore, neutral reportage, which 
focuses on the newsworthiness of the public controversy, as 
opposed to the author's subjective belief in its veracity or the 
status of the plaintiff, is in line with the Court's current 
constitutional analysis as it concerns private and public 
plaintiffs.
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2. Neutral reportage is in accordance with 
New York Times v» Sullivan^s actual malice
standard.
Neutral reportage arises from the same First Amendment 
concerns as the actual malice standard. See Justin H. Wertman, 
The Newsworthiness Requirement of the Privilege of Neutral
Reportage is a Matter of Public Concern, 65 Fordham L. Rev. 789, 
797 (1996). However, it differs from New York Times in that it 
protects republishers who have subjective doubt as to the truth 
of the substantive allegations, but report the charges neutrally 
and accurately. The falsehood is not afforded the protection, 
rather it is the reporting of the allegations that are shielded. 
Moreover, the injured plaintiff is not barred relief, but can 
seek dcunages for the defamatory falsehood against the original 
libelant.
Unlike original publications, republications have two tiers 
of truth or falsity. The first is the truth or falsity of the 
defamatory remark of the original source. See James E, Boasberg, 
With Malice Toward None: A New Look At Defamatory Republication
and Neutral Reportage, 13 Hastings Comm. & Ent. L.J. 455, 467 
(1991) . The second is the truth or falsity of the report on the 
defamatory remarks. See id. The neutral reportage privilege 
does not protect the underlying defamatory remark, but protects 
the newspaper in its accurate report about the allegation the 
source has made. See id. The privilege exists because there is
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a need for reporting newsworthy allegations that might be 
unverifiable. Hence, the privilege is not an appendage to the 
actual malice test established in New York Times, but is a new 
and coexistent breed of constitutional protection,
B. The Doctrine of Neutral Reportage Is Also Rooted
in the Common Law Privilege of Fair Report.
The common law privilege of fair report protects the fair 
and accurate reporting of any statement uttered in judicial, 
legislative or executive proceedings about public or private 
figures. Mark W. Page, Price v. Viking Penguin, Inc.: The
Neutral Reportage Privilege and Robust, Wide Open Debate, 75
Minn. L. Rev. 157, 161-62 (1990). Thus, the fair report 
privilege provides republishers with a broader protection than 
the New York Times "actual malice" standard alone and implicitly 
recognizes that the republished statements promote self- 
government "merely because they are said" irrespective of the 
author's subjective belief in their veracity. See Comment, 
Constitutional Privilege to Republish Defamation, 77 Colum. L, 
Rev. 1266, 1269 (1977).
Similarly, neutral reportage protects republished 
allegations solely for their informational purposes. See Scott 
E. Saef, Neutral Reportage: The Case for a Statutory Privilege, 
86 Nw. U. L. Rev. 417, 424 (1992). In New York Times, the Court 
reasoned that "protection of the public requires not merely 
discussion, but information." New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 
U.S. 254, 272 (1964). Hence, the unobstructed dissemination of
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newsworthy information protects the public's right to self- 
governance. Neutral reportage protects the "vital pulse of ideas 
and intelligence on which an informed self-governing people 
depend." Edwards^ 556 F.2d at 122. The public interest resides 
in the need for full disclosure of information about 
controversies that rage around "sensitive issues." Id. at 120. 
Ultimately, the republisher, or informer, may be the only link 
between the newsworthy statement and the public. Thus, the 
republisher must be afforded the neutral reportage 
constitutionally-based protection to disseminate newsworthy 
information.
C. The Constitutional and Common Law Foundation for
the Neutral Reportage Privilege Has Been Acknowledged
in California Case Law.
California case law protects speech of public interest that 
is reported accurately and neutrally regardless of the author's 
subjective doubt in the allegations. See Weingarten v. Block,
102 Cal. App. 3d 129, 148 (1980). In Weingarten, the court 
implicitly supported the underlying elements of the privilege.
The court held that under the First Amendment the republication 
of newsworthy public controversies are privileged, regardless of 
the author's doubts about their veracity. See id. The court 
emphasized the need for public access to information about public 
controversies without assuming responsibility of original libel. 
See id.
Similarly, in Grillo v. Smith, 144 Cal. App. 3d 868, 872
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(1983), the court afforded statements of opinion absolute 
privilege. Citing Edwards, the Grillo court emphasized the 
importance of providing "double protection" for third party 
opinions such as those of republishers. See id. Even though 
Grillo concerned the protection of opinions, the underlying 
rationale is the same: to serve the public interest, a 
republisher must have freedom to report allegations without 
assuming liability. See id. (citing Edwards, 556 F.2d at 120; 
referring to Weingarten, 102 Cal. App. 3d at 148.)
Moreover, in Grillo the Court held that a publisher is not 
responsible for the strained interpretation a reader might attach 
to its words in the publication. 144 Cal. App. 3d at 874. 
Therefore, courts must refrain from "scrutinizing what is not 
said to find 'a defamatory meaning which the article does not 
convey to a lay reader.'" See Forsher v. Bugliosi, 26 Cal. 3d 
792, 803 (1980) (quoting Mullins v. Thieriot, 19 Cal. App. 3d 302, 
304 (1971)).
The Grillo and Forsher courts relax the common law rule that 
holds republishers liable for the republication of potentially 
defamatory statements made by the original publisher. See Gilman 
V. McClatchy, 111 Cal. 606, 612 (1896) (for the common law rule.) 
Grillo and Forsher, in modifying Gilman, imply that if the 
cumulative effect of a publication is neutral and accurate, then 
republishers should not be liable for the unreasonable reader's 
strained interpretation of reports. Therefore, the republisher
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who accurately republishes news of public interest should be 
privileged.
III. THE GLOBE ARTICLE IS AN ACCURATE AND NEUTRAL REPORT OF 
A NEWSWORTHY STATEMENT PRIVILEGED UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF 
NEUTR7U. REPORTAGE.
In exercising its First Amendment privilege, the Globe 
neutrally and accurately informed the public about a newsworthy 
publication which concerned a public controversy: the 
assassination of Senator Robert Kennedy. Hence, the article 
satisfies the elements of neutral reportage as defined in Edwards 
and developed in subsequent case law: (1) the republisher must 
neutrally and accurately republish allegations, (2) about a 
public figure involved in a newsworthy controversy (3) made by a 
third source.
A. The Globe Article Is a Neutral and Accurate
Republication of Allegations About a Limited-
Purpose Public Figure Concerning a Public
Controversy.
The Globe article, through the use of disclaimers, neutrally 
and accurately reports the charges against Respondent made by a 
responsible third source, ex-Central Intelligence Agency ("CIA") 
agent Mr. Robert Morrow. Here, Respondent is an involuntary 
limited-purpose public figure who was drawn into the vortex of 
the Kennedy assassination. Furthermore, the allegations made by 
Mr. Morrow and accurately republished by Globe, concern 
Respondent in his connection to that public controversy.
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1. The Globe article is a neutral and accurate 
republication about a limited-purpose public
figure«
Globe accurately and neutrally republished the allegations 
about Respondent, a limited-purpose public figure, made by 
Mr. Robert Morrow in his book The Senator Must Die. Mr. Jonathan 
L. Kirsch, Globe's expert witness and contributor to the Los 
Angeles Times, testified that the use of terms such as "Morrow 
claims" and "Morrow charges" indicate to the reader that "there's 
a disclaimer, that [Globe] is not standing behind the charges 
that they're reporting on." (R.T. 859:18-20.) Globe was not 
endorsing or exaggerating the allegations, but merely reporting 
the allegations of the book in a disinterested manner.
Globe, an international magazine, is in the business of 
informing its readers about public controversies. This Court 
should not base a defamation finding, nor hold the paper 
responsible, for strained interpretations of its many readers.
See Greenbelt Coop. Publ'g Assn, v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 13-14 
(1970). Therefore, this Court's analysis should focus upon the 
reasonable reader.
In Greenbelt, the Supreme Court used a "reasonable reader" 
focus to deter strained interpretations of "rhetorical" or 
"vigorous epithet" such as the term "blackmail." See id. There, 
the Greenbelt News Review reported that at several public 
meetings people classified the plaintiff's negotiating position
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as "blackmail." See id. at 7. The word "blackmail" appeared 
several times with and without quotation marks and was used once 
as a subheading within a newsstory. See id. at 7-8. The Court 
held that the reasonable reader would not have concluded that the 
Greenbelt Review was imputing a crime on the plaintiff by using 
the word "blackmail." See id. at 13. Instead, the word was used 
as "rhetorical hyperbole, a vigorous epithet" to demonstrate the 
declarant's views about plaintiff. Id. at 14.
Here, the Globe's use of terms such as "dramatic new 
evidence reveals" is not dispositive of its exaggeration of the 
allegations. Under Greenbelt the Court would necessarily 
conclude that Globe did not endorse or exaggerate Mr. Morrow's 
theory. Any other conclusion would be a strained interpretation. 
Similar to the word "blackmail," "dramatic evidence reveals" is a 
"rhetorical hyperbole, a vigorous epithet," Id. Therefore, when 
interpreting such language this Court should avoid a strained 
interpretation in order to find malicious motives on the part of 
Globe. Ultimately, the decision to use phrases such as,
"dramatic evidence reveals" is merely a "valid exercise of 
literary license." See Reader's Digest Assoc., 37 Cal. 3d at 
262.
A neutral and accurate report does not have to recount the 
literal words of the original declarant. See Edwards, 556 F.2d 
at 120. A republication containing the essence of the original 
publication, though not in its original language, may be
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privileged from suit as long as it fairly and accurately recounts 
the allegations against the third person. See Pape, 401 U.S. at 
285-86. In Pape the republication concerned a report put out by 
the Civil Rights Commission. The publication was considered 
privileged even though both the author of the article and the 
researcher "admitted an awareness at the time of the publication 
that the wording of the Commission Report had been significantly 
altered." Id. The Court concluded that the New York Times 
omission of the word "alleged" from the republication did not 
amount to a "falsification" in order to sustain a jury finding of 
actual malice. See id. at 289. Similarly, Globe did not have to 
republish literal words written or spoken by Mr. Morrow. In 
fact, like the author in Pape, Mr. Blackburn testified that the 
published article was a "fair rewrite of what [he] submitted [to 
the Globe]." (R.T. 1107:2-4.) Hence, he saw "no conflicts 
between this story, and what [he] originally submitted [to the 
Globe]." (R.T, 1107:2-4.)
To determine the accuracy of the Globe article, as it 
recounts Mr. Morrow's allegations, the court must take the 
republication in its entire context. See generally Forsher, 26 
Cal. 3d at 803 (stating that to determine whether statements are 
libelous the court must look at "what is explicitly stated as 
well as what insinuation and implication can be reasonably drawn 
from the communication"). Therefore, even though the photograph 
was used without the knowledge of Mr. Blackburn, its inclusion
26
did not alter the neutral content of the report. The photograph 
is a reproduction from the book. An excerpt from the book 
contains similar shots of Respondent at the podium with Senator 
Kennedy under which the caption reads: "Ali Ahmand in sweater 
next to Robert Kennedy minutes before Kennedy was assassinated." 
(Court Transcript ("C.T.") 156, 172, 173.) The arrow, used by 
Globe, is the functional equivalent of the captions in the book, 
it points out the position of Ali Ahmand in the picture.^
Finally, the First Amendment protection of free press is not 
limited to statements "whose validity are beyond question or 
which reflect an objective picture of the reported events." See 
Weingarten, 102 Cal. App. 3d at 151. Here, Mr. Blackburn, who 
had no reason to doubt the veracity of his source, was not 
required to obtain Respondent's version of the events, see id. at 
147, or provide an objective picture, see New York Times Co. v. 
Connor, 365 F.2d 567, 576 (5th Cir. 1966), or verify his 
information, see Fadell v. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 425 F. 
Supp. 1075, 1085 (N.D. Ind. 1976). Moreover, Mr. Blackburn was 
not obligated to investigate Mr. Morrow's allegations, because 
Globe lacked actual malice and did not concur or exaggerate in 
the allegations. See In re United Press Int'l, 106 B.R. 323, 330 
(D.C, Cir. 1989)(holding that there is no duty to conduct further
^Furthermore, the trial judge's sua sponte, post trial finding 
that the photographs did not match should be given no weight 
during de novo review. The issue regarding the neutrality of the 
photograph was not being litigated by the parties.
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investigation if republisher did not concur or exaggerate in the 
allegations).
If the doctrine of neutral reportage were to require that 
republishers conduct additional investigations/ the privilege 
would be useless. The goal of neutral reportage is to protect 
the republisher who has subjective doubt about the veracity of 
the allegations, but nonetheless reports the news, allowing the 
public to decide the truth of the matter asserted.
2. The Globe article reported on a newsworthy 
allegation of public concern surrounding the
assassination of Senator Robert Kennedy.
In Edwards, the court held that given the newsworthiness of 
the allegations and the First Amendment right to free press, the 
New York Times was not required to suppress the republication of 
the statements made by the Audubon Society about supporters of 
the insecticide DDT. 556 F.2d at 113. Therefore, an accurate 
republication of a statement of public interest made by a 
prominent and responsible source, such as the Audubon Society, 
bars any liability on the part of the republisher, regardless of 
her subjective belief about the validity of the news story. See 
id. The statements or accusations made by the Audubon Society 
were newsworthy simply because "they were made." See id. at 119.
Similarly the Globe article is a report on a matter of 
public interest: the assassination of Senator Robert Kennedy.
The article merely informs the public about the existence of a 
book that contains noteworthy and newsworthy allegations. The
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publication is newsworthy because it directly relates to the 
assassination of a member of the Kennedy family, one of the most 
prominent and public families in the nation.
Furthermore, the prominent press frequently treats the 
publication of a book as a newsworthy event. (R.T. 1599.) For 
example, in a 1993 article, the Los Angeles Times announced the 
publication of the book Spider's Web in exactly the same manner 
as the Globe article. (R.T. 1599-1600.) Similarly, in a 1994 
article, the New York Times reported about the publication of 
Opening Argument in the same manner as the Globe article. (R.T. 
1600.) All three reports. New York Times, Los Angeles Times and 
Globe, are "new articles which treat the publication of a book 
as a newsworthy event." (R.T. 1600:9-10.) By denying the 
privilege to republish and inform the public, the court 
discourages the dissemination of news and ideas and undermines 
the United States Supreme Court's intent to preserve the 
"'unfettered interchange of ideas for bringing about of political 
and social changes desired by the people.'" See New York Times, 
376 U.S. at 269 (citation omitted.)
In sum, the accurate and disinterested reporting of a 
newsworthy event serves the public interest by fully informing 
members of the public about controversies that concern them.
Such issues demand "that the [republishers] be afforded the 
freedom to report [newsworthy issues] without responsibility for 
[their ultimate accuracy.]" See Edwards, 556 F.2d at 119.
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3, The original newsworthy statement was made by 
a responsible and prominent source.
The neutral reportage privilege protects newsworthy publications
made by prominent and responsible sources. See Edwards/ 556 F.2d
122 (source of the allegation was the Audubon Society, a
responsible and "well-noted organization"); see also Barry v.
Time, Inc., 584 F. Supp. 1110, 1126 (N.D, Cal. 1984) (eradicating
the trustworthiness requirement). Here, Mr. Morrow had
established prominence in his field. For example, his first
book, Betrayal, made possible the creation of the House Select
Committee on Assassinations. (R.T. 842-43.) Moreover,
Congressman Dawning's letter to Mr. Morrow, included in the book
The Senator Must Die, (R.T. 841-42), stated that "[ijt [was] no
exaggeration to say that the information [in Betrayal] coupled
with additional confidential material supplied to him by
Mr. Morrow, helped make the creation of the House Select
Committee on Assassinations possible." (R.T. 843:12-18.)
Mr. Blackburn could reasonably rely on Mr. Morrow's 
expertise in the subject area of conspiracies given that 
Roundtable Publishing identified him as both a former CIA 
contract agent and agent. (R.T. 848.) In fact, Mr. Blackburn 
testified there was nothing in the book to concern him about Mr, 
Morrow's background or credibility. (R.T, 1095.) Hence, Globe's 
neutral and accurate report of Mr. Morrow's allegations is 
privileged under neutral reportage.
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B. Alternatively/ the Neutral Reportage Privilege 
Should Be Extended to Publications Regarding
Private Figures Involved in Public Controversies,
There is no legitimate difference between the republisher's 
accurate and neutral reporting of allegations made against a 
private figure and "those made against a public figure, when the 
accusations themselves are newsworthy and concern a matter of 
public interest." April v. Reflector-Herald, Inc., 546 N.E,2d 
466, 469 (1988). Neutral reportage protects the public's access 
to information and self government. These values do not become 
any less important when the status of the plaintiff changes, but 
the controversy is of public concern. See Hepps, 475 U.S. at 
776, The fact that a statement is "newsworthy" or of public 
interests is mutually exclusive from the status of the plaintiff. 
See Marburger, supra at 17. Therefore, even if this Court finds 
Respondent to be a private figure, the neutral reportage 
privilege still applies, because the accurate and neutral 
republisher is not the one purporting the falsehood.
Furthermore, the privilege does not effect private figures' 
cause of action against the original libelant. The privilege 
would also place original publishers on notice to exercise a 
greater degree of care when writing about private figures.
Hence, as the April court noted, there is no legitimate 
difference between the press' accurate reporting of accusations 
made against private figure and those made against a public 
figures, especially when the accusations themselves are
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newsworthy and concern a matter of public interest. See April, 
546 N.E.2d at 469.
IV. GLOBE LACKED THE NECESS7VRY CONSTITUTIONAL MALICE
REQUIRED FOR RESPONDENT TO RECOVER IN THIS ACTION.
The doctrine that originated in New York Times culminated in 
the seminal exposition on constitutional "actual malice" in the 
case of St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968). This Court 
has since followed the definition of actual malice set forth in 
that case. See McCoy v. Hearst Corp., 42 Cal, 3d 835, 847 (1986) 
(relying on St. Amant for guidance). Globe failed to publish 
its report of Robert Morrow's book with the requisite actual 
malice required by St. TVnant, and we therefore ask this Court to 
reverse the decision of the lower court and find in favor of 
Globe. This Court must "independently decide whether the 
evidence" is sufficient to strip the defendant of constitutional 
protection. McCoy, 42 Cal. 3d at 842. Thus, this Court reviews 
the issue of actual malice de novo. Id.
A, Respondent Has Failed to Show by Clear and Convincing
Evidence That Globe Acted Knowingly or With Reckless
Disregard of the Falsity of the Statements.
Actual malice is defined as acting with knowledge that the 
statements were false or with a reckless disregard as to their 
falsity. See New York Times, 376 U.S, at 279-80. Reckless 
disregard does not ask if a reasonable person would have 
published the statements but, rather, if the evidence is clear 
and convincing that the defendant "in fact entertained serious
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St, Amant/ 390 U.S. atdoubts as the truth of his publication."
731. The defendant must have exhibited a "'high degree of 
awareness of , . , probable falsity.'" Id. (citation omitted.) 
But such reckless disregard cannot be "encompassed in one 
infallible definition . . . [but must] be marked out through 
case-by-case adjudication," at 730.
In St. Amant, a political candidate, the petitioner St. 
Amant, made a televised speech in which he revealed the details 
of a question and answer session he had with a member of the 
Teamsters Union local. 390 U.S. at 728. The questioning 
concerned alleged "nefarious" activities by the president of the 
local. See id. The Teamster member implicated a local deputy 
sheriff, the respondent Thompson. See id. The Teamster member 
indicated that money had passed hands between the president of 
the local and Thompson in a plan to "[secret] union records."
at 728-29. The Court accepted the lower court's finding that 
the statements were false, but held that Thompson had failed to 
prove actual malice. See id. at 730.
The Court found nothing in the record which gave rise to "an 
awareness by St. Amant" that the statements were false; as such, 
mere failure to investigate was insufficient to establish actual 
malice. Id. at 733. Moreover, St. Amant's failure to recognize 
the "import" of the statements and the possible consequences for 
Thompson was also insufficient to establish actual malice. See
Finally, the Court stated that the lack of evidence with
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regard to the reliability of the Teamster member and his 
reputation for veracity underscored Thompson's failure to 
demonstrate a "low community assessment of [the Teamster 
member's] trustworthiness or unsatisfactory experience with him 
by St. Amant." Id. Accordingly, the Court held that Thompson 
had failed to prove St. Amant had knowledge that the statements 
were false or acted in reckless disregard of the truth. See id. 
at 730.
Similarly, here, Respondent failed to prove that the Globe, 
and more particularly, Mr. Blackburn, the author of the article 
in question, acted with the requisite actual malice. The record 
contains no evidence that Mr. Blackburn entertained serious 
doubts about the truthfulness of the information in Mr. Morrow's 
book. Nor did the Respondent prove in any way that Mr. Morrow or 
Roundtable, the publisher of Mr. Morrow's book, were unreliable 
and, therefore, in "low community" standing with regard to their 
trustworthiness. In fact, the record proves quite the opposite. 
Mr. Blackburn had every reason to believe that the statements in 
Mr. Morrow's book could be true.
First, Mr. Morrow told Mr. Blackburn in their interview that 
his previous book. Betrayal, had led to the formation of the 
House Select Committee on Assassinations. (R.T. 841.)
Mr. Morrow had a letter from Congressman Downing, who initiated 
the committee, which stated that Mr. Morrow's theory on the death 
of John F, Kennedy was remarkably plausible. (R.T. 841.)
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Second/ Mr. Morrow indicated that he had in the past worked 
as a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) operative. (R.T. 847.) 
This fact could not be substantiated by Mr. Blackburn, because if 
Mr. Morrow was an operative, the CIA would not reveal that fact. 
(R.T. 855.) As proof, however, Mr. Morrow produced a letter 
written by Richard Nixon, asking for leniency by the court in a 
case in which Mr. Morrow and his confidant in the CIA were being 
tried for counterfeiting Cuban money, which they contended was in 
aid of the anti-Castro movement headed by the CIA. (R.T. 852.)
Third, the forward to Mr. Morrow's book, The Senator Must 
Die, was written by Colonel Prouty, a well-known conspiracy 
theorist and technical advisor to Oliver Stone on the film JFK. 
(R.T. 882.) Mr. Blackburn testified that he knew Colonel Prouty, 
but he could not remember if he called him after the interview 
with Mr. Morrow. (R.T. 1084.) Regardless of whether he called, 
the fact that Mr. Blackburn knew Colonel Prouty and that Colonel 
Prouty wrote the forward to Mr. Morrow's book was sufficient for 
Mr. Blackburn to reasonably and in good faith rely on Colonel 
Prouty's support for the book.
Fourth, Mr. Blackburn testified that he knew Thomas Naguchi, 
the coroner who performed the autopsy on Robert Kennedy, and that 
this fact made the statements and claims in Mr, Morrow's book 
plausible. (R.T. 1124.) Mr. Naguchi had previously written his 
own book expounding on a conspiracy surrounding the death of 
Robert Kennedy. (R.T, 892.) Mr. Naguchi had previously told
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Mr. Blackburn that there was more than one gunman based on the 
findings of his autopsy, which revealed that a bullet entered 
Robert Kennedy's head from behind. (R.T. 1124.) This inevitably 
led Mr. Blackburn to believe that Mr. Morrow's theory was a 
serious possibility.
Finally, Respondent's own expert witness, Robert Kaiser, the 
author of RFK Must Die, testified that he thought Mr. Morrow was 
not completely sane. (R.T. 2151.) However, Mr. Kaiser in his 
own book specifically asks why the Respondent, in such close 
proximity to Robert Kennedy on the night of the killing, had not 
been interviewed as a suspect. (R.T. 1408.)
Mr. Kaiser, a conspiracy theorist himself, obviously thought 
at the time he wrote RFK Must Die that it was possible Respondent 
could have played a part in the assassination of Robert Kennedy. 
Mr. Kaiser could not now support Mr. Morrow's theory without 
debunking his own, and thereby damaging his own credibility.
Lacking a high degree of awareness of the probable falsity 
of the statements or serious doubts as to their truthfulness,
Mr. Blackburn did not publish his article with actual malice as 
defined by the Court in St. Amant and accepted by this Court in 
McCoy. 42 Cal. 3d at 864. Moreover, any failure to investigate 
by Mr. BlacJcburn, without a high degree of awareness of probable 
falsity, is insufficient under St. Amant to warrant a finding of 
actual malice. 390 U.S. at 733; see also Gertz, 418 U.S. at 323 
(citing St. Amant as authority). Mr. Blackburn was justified in
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presenting one side of the story so long as he lacked serious
doubts - i.e., actual malice. See Reader's Digest, 37 Cal. 3d at 
259. Malice is strictly a subjective test# interested solely in 
the defendant's state of mind regarding the truthfulness of the 
statements. See id, at 257. The Respondent has failed to show 
by clear and convincing evidence that Mr. Blackburn harbored 
serious doubts about the truthfulness of the statements. Thus# 
Respondent has failed to prove the actual malice as required by 
St. Amant. Accordingly, this Court is asked to find in favor of 
the Globe.
B. Even If This Court Finds Respondent To Be a Private
Figure# He Still Must Prove Constitutional Malice
In Order To Recover Punitive or Presumed Damages#
Because the Statements Concerned a Public Controversy.
Private individuals must prove constitutional malice in 
order to recover presumed or punitive damages in a defamation 
suit. See Gertz# 418 U.S. at 349, The Court later qualified 
this rule by requiring that a private plaintiff must only show 
actual malice if the defamatory statement go directly to an issue 
of public concern. See Dun & Bradstreet# 472 U.S. at 761.
As shown above# in section I (A), the defamatory statements here 
go directly to a public controversy. Therefore, if this Court 
finds the Respondent to be a private figure# he must still prove 
actual malice by substantial evidence. However# as shown above, 
in section 11(A), Respondent has failed to make such a showing; 
therefore, should this Court find Respondent to be a private
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figure# we pray that the Court reverse the award of punitive and 
presumed damages.
CONCLUSION
Respondent is an involuntary limited-purpose public figure 
regard to the public controversy surrounding the 
assassination of Senator Robert F. Kennedy because he was drawn 
into the controversy and played more than a tangential or trivial 
role. Mr. Morrow, in his book The Senator Must Die, alleged that 
Respondent was connected to the assassination. Globe neutrally 
and accurately reported these allegations; therefore. Globe 
should be privileged under the doctrine of neutral reportage. 
Neutral reportage, an extension of the constitutional protection 
of free press and common law privilege of fair report, should be 
adopted in California and applied to both public and private 
figures. Finally, Respondent failed to prove by clear and 
convincing evidence that the article was published with actual 
malice.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of 
Appeal for the Second District should be reversed.
Dated: October 29, 1997
Counsel for Petitioner 
Globe International, Inc.
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